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International Rent Sharing and Domestic Labour Markets: a Macroeconomic Analysis 
W. Jos Jansen and Ad C.J. Stokman 
 
Foreign subsidiaries account for a significant part of output in many industrialised countries. However, 
compared to international trade, relatively little is known about the role of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and multinational firm behaviour in the transmission of disturbances from one country to the 
next. Inspired by the micro-evidence on profit sharing within multinational corporations and within 
industries, we investigate whether a cross-border rent-sharing phenomenon can be identified at the 
macro-level. The rent-sharing hypothesis implies that an increase in foreign profitability should boost 
wages and/or employment in the domestic economy.  
Our empirical study provides evidence that international rent sharing might be an important aspect of 
global economic linkages. Especially in continental Europe and the UK, labour market conditions 
(wages and/or employment) are significantly affected by profitability conditions abroad. The US 
labour market, on the other hand, does not appear to be sensitive to changes in profitability in other 
countries, which could be explained by the still relatively modest role of FDI capital in the American 
economy.        
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International rent sharing en nationale arbeidsmarkten: een macroeconomische analyse 
W. Jos Jansen en Ad C.J. Stokman 
 
Buitenlandse dochterondernemingen nemen in veel geïndustrialiseerde landen een aanzienlijk deel van 
de productie voor hun rekening. Echter, vergeleken met internationale handel is betrekkelijk weinig 
bekend over de betekenis van buitenlandse directe investeringen en het gedrag van multinationale 
ondernemingen voor de transmissie van economische schokken van het ene land naar het andere. 
Geïnspireerd door de micro-economische empirische steun voor winstdeling binnen multinationale 
ondernemingen en binnen sectoren, onderzoeken wij in dit paper of ook op macroeconomisch niveau 
aanwijzingen gevonden kunnen worden voor wat in de economische literatuur bekend staat als 
international rent sharing. In een aantal grote en kleine Europese landen blijkt hogere (lagere) 
buitenlandse winstgevendheid inderdaad te leiden tot hogere (lagere) binnenlandse lonen en meer 
(minder) werkgelegenheid. Voor de VS konden we geen significante invloed vaststellen, hetgeen  
vermoedelijk samenhangt met de nog relatief bescheiden rol van buitenlandse directe investeringen 
daar. 
 





































1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past decades, the national economies have become more integrated through ever intensifying 
foreign trade relations and international financial relations. For example, cross-borders holdings of 
stocks and bonds have grown spectacularly in the past twenty years due to sharply lower transaction 
costs and the worldwide trend towards capital account liberalisation and financial sector deregulation. 
An important aspect of international economic integration is the larger role of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in the economy. FDI has grown at rates far greater than those of international trade 
or output have since the late 1980s, especially among the industrialised countries. Estimates by the 
UNCTAD (2002) put the total stock of FDI capital at 17.5% of global GDP in 2000, more than double 
the size in 1990 (8.3%). A direct consequence of the greater presence of foreign-owned firms is the 
internationalisation of production. Currently, about 11% of global production is accounted for by 
companies that are under control of foreign investors. 
 
The rise in international economic interdependence means that economic conditions in one country 
have become increasingly sensitive to disturbances occurring in other economies. The ‘traditional’ 
channel through which economies may affect each other is formed by international trade flows. 
Furthermore, it is widely recognised that the increase in international capital mobility has boosted the 
importance of financial markets as a conduit for the cross-border transmission of disturbances. 
Correlations among the major stock markets have greatly increased in the past twenty years (Berben 
and Jansen 2002). As a consequence, international trade flows and financial asset prices serve as the 
main linkages among economies in the macroeconometric models that are currently used for making 
forecasts and conducting policy analyses by national and international policy makers. 
 
By contrast, comparatively little is known about the role of FDI and multinational firm behaviour in 
the transmission of disturbances from one country to the next at the aggregate level. The empirical 
literature on the impact of FDI mainly deals with supply-side effects on host economies in the longer 
run – focusing on the transfer of technology, management techniques and business models – rather 
than business cycle issues. Jansen and Stokman (2003) recently found that countries maintaining 
comparatively intense FDI relations also have business cycles that are more correlated, even when we 
control for the intensity of bilateral trade relations. Next to foreign trade flows and financial flows, 
FDI thus appears to be a separate, third channel through which economies may affect each other in an 
economically significant fashion. This finding naturally raises the q uestion how the FDI channel 
operates. What are the underlying mechanisms at work? 
 
This paper aims to contribute to the literature on economic integration by empirically investigating a 
mechanism that may explain in what way FDI and the associated internationalization of production  
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may affect cross-country business cycle correlations. The starting point of our analysis is the practice 
of profit sharing within multinational corporations (also known as international rent sharing), which 
has been documented by Budd and Slaughter (2000) and Budd, Konings and Slaughter (2002). These 
authors find that wages at a multinational company’s subsidiaries are not only determined by local 
factors, but also by profits at the company level. In our empirical analysis, we analyse the 
macroeconomic version of international rent sharing. We examine for six countries whether domestic 
labour market conditions (wages and employment) are determined in part by profitability conditions 
abroad. The rent-sharing hypothesis implies that an increase in foreign profitability should boost 
wages and employment in the domestic economy. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the main trends in FDI 
positions, the significance of foreign affiliates for host-economy output and employment, and the 
channels through which FDI may transmit disturbances across borders. Section 3 focuses on micro-
level evidence of rent sharing. Section 4 reports the results of our labour market analysis. Section 5 






2  FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: SOME FACTS 
 
Foreign direct investments are financial transactions aimed at acquiring a lasting interest in a company 
in another country. A lasting interest means that the direct investor has a long-term relationship with 
and significant influence on the management and policies of the foreign company. Direct investment 
commonly takes place when a company in one country obtains all or much of the share capital of a 
company in another country, often via merger and acquisition. In statistics, ownership of at least ten 
percent of the ordinary shares or voting stock is the criterion for the existence of a direct investment 
relationship. Ownership of less than ten percent is recorded as a portfolio investment. FDI comprises 
not only mergers and take-overs / acquisitions and new investments, but also reinvested earnings and 
loans and similar capital transfers between parents and affiliates. 
 
Industrial countries typically act both as host to FDI projects in their own country and as participant in 
investment projects in other countries. A country’s inward FDI position is made up of the hosted FDI 
projects, while the outward FDI position consists of the FDI projects owned abroad. Both larger 
inward and outward FDI positions may  make the domestic economy more sensitive to economic 
disturbances abroad in the short run. 
 
Main trends in FDI 
Foreign direct investment has increased very rapidly in the OECD area since the mid-1980s, with a 
marked acceleration since 1995 (Annex I, Figure 1A). The background to this development is the on-
going liberalisation of international capital flows, the further dismantling of trade barriers and progress 
in information and communication technology. The favourable economic climate in the second half of 
the 1990s also promoted the growth of direct investment. The outward FDI position of the two largest 
EMU-countries Germany and France is currently around 25% of GDP, four to five times the level of 
1985. For traditional investor countries like the UK and the Netherlands, positions are much larger, 
55% and 80% respectively. The outward investment position of the US increased from 5% of GDP in 
1985 to 13% in 2000. As outward and inward FDI positions tend to move in tandem over time, gross 
positions have grown much faster than net positions. The increase in FDI ties among the industrialised 
countries can thus be characterised as a process of diversification. The Japanese experience does not 
fit in with the general picture. Japanese corporations even reduced their presence abroad in the second 
half of the 1990s, while Japan’s stock of inward FDI is very small (1% of GDP in 2000). Finally, 
foreign direct investment grew much faster than foreign trade in almost every country (Annex I, 
Figure 1B). This implies that the links between economies via foreign direct investment have gained in 




FDI and its significance for the host economies 
The presence of foreign investors means that part of domestic output is produced by firms controlled 
by foreigners. Comprehensive data on the share of output accounted for by foreign affiliates are 
scarce. In Table 1 we have collected some data, taken from several sources that may give an 
impression o f the weight of foreign-owned companies in the manufacturing sector and the total 
economy in 13 host countries in 1989 and 1998-1999. The table first shows the output produced by 
majority-owned foreign affiliates (MOFA) of US companies as a percentage of host country GDP in 
12 countries 1. US MOFAs alone were responsible for 17% of Irish GDP, 10% of Canadian GDP and 
7% of UK GDP in 1999. In Australia, Belgium and the Netherlands, their output share was around 
5%. If we combine this information with the share of the US in the host country’s inward FDI 
position, if available, we arrive at a back-of-the-envelope estimate of the output share of all foreign 
affiliates taken together 2. These, admittedly rough, estimates indicate that between 10 and 20% of 
GDP could be accounted for by foreign-owned firms, pointing to a substantial role for foreign 
affiliates in the domestic economy. Because the US economy is so large, foreign affiliates still account 
for a relatively small part of US GDP: 5.6% in 1999 and 6.0% in  2000 (Zeile 2002). Still, this 
represents a substantial increase from the level ten years ago (4.1%). 
 
Table 1 also reports, depending on availability, the share in employment in the manufacturing sector 
accounted for by foreign affiliates in 1998. As foreign-owned firms are generally characterised by high 
labour productivity, their share in employment is somewhat smaller than that in output. These numbers 
also point to a potentially important influence of multinational firm behaviour on host economies. 
 
Effects of FDI 
Favourable supply-side effects from FDI can theoretically be explained by more recent developments 
in growth theory, which highlights the importance of improvements in technology, efficiency and 
productivity in stimulating growth (Ewe-Ghee Lim 2001). Empirically, there is solid evidence that the 
presence of foreign companies has a beneficial effect on the economy of the capital -importing country 
(Blomström, Globerman and Kokko 2000; Barrell and Pain, 1997). The available evidence suggests 
that  productivity in domestically owned companies improves as more foreign-owned companies 
operate in an economy as a result of foreign direct investment. This type of spillover reflects the 




1 US FDI in MOFAs is approximately 85% of total outward FDI. 
2 We computed the estimated output share of all foreign affiliates by dividing the US MOFA output share by the US share in 
inward FDI (as reported by the host country).  
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Table 1  The role of foreign affiliates in host economies 
Percentages 
 
  Share in host country 
GDP of US affiliates  
Estimated share in 
host country GDP of 
all foreign affiliates  





p.m. US share in host 
country inward FDI 
stock  
  __________________  __________________  ____________  _________________ 
  1989  1999  1989  1999  1998  1989  1999 
  ________  ________  ________  ________  ____________  ________  _______ 
Australia  4.9  4.7  18.7  10.8  -  26.3  43.6 
Belgium   5.6  5.1  -  -  -  -  - 
Canada  9.5  10.0  14.5  14.4  -  65.6  69.5 
France  2.3  2.6  12.0  15.0  27.8  19.1  17.3 
Germany  3.0  2.9  9.3  12.0  7.2  32.4  24.2 
Ireland  12.4  16.8  -  -  36.8  -  - 
Italy  1.9  2.0  12.7  15.0  14.0  15.0  13.3 
Japan  0.5  0.7  1.0  1.7  1.8  50.5  40.5 
The Netherlands  5.8  4.5  21.4  17.7  21.9  27.1  25.4 
Sweden  1.2  2.6  12.2  19.6  26.8  9.9  13.2 
Switzerland  2.9  3.3  12.3  10.3  -  23.6  32.0 
UK  6.2  7.0  14.7  14.9  27.3  42.1  47.0 
US  -  -  4.1  5.6  13.4  -  - 
 
Sources: columns 1 and 2: Borga and Yorgason (2002); US data: Zeile (2002); columns 3 and 4: own 
calculations; column 5: UNCTAD (2002) and OECD (2002); columns 6 and 7: UNCTAD (2002). 
 
 
magnitude of these supply-side effects is largely dependent on the ability of the host economy to 
absorb foreign technology. If there is a large difference in technological level between direct investor 
and host country, domestic companies will have difficulty in adopting the new technology and so the 
positive spillover on the economy will be limited. This explains why FDI is highly concentrated in 
developed countries. 
 
Apart from affecting the supply side in the longer run, FDI (inward as well as outward) may make the 
domestic economy more sensitive to economic disturbances abroad in the short run. Studying business 
cycle correlations of Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and the US  – among 
themselves and with six other industrialised countries – in the years 1982–2001, Jansen and Stokman 
(2003) report that higher bilateral business cycle correlations are associated with closer bilateral FDI 
relationships. 
 
The macroeconomic vulnerability related to outward FDI has to do with the consequences that 
disturbances abroad might have for the financial position of the investing domestic firms. 
Unfavourable developments abroad may reduce the value of their overseas investment projects, and 
thus the value of the domestic firms. This reduction of net worth may lead to lower stock prices and 
greater difficulties for domestic firms in securing external finance for planned domestic investment 
projects, both in the capital market and with banks. Domestic investment may thus be hurt via the  
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balance sheet channel and the stock market channel (Tobin’s q). The fall in stock prices may adversely 
affect domestic consumption via wealth effects, balance sheet effects and confidence effects. These 
types of effects are outside the scope of this paper, however, as financial asset prices play a crucial 
part in the transmission of shocks. 
 
As the inward position represents imported capital, the host country always runs the risk that foreign 
investors, for whatever reason, may want to withdraw their money. More generally, a deterioration of 
the economic conditions in the foreign investor’s home country may weaken the financial health of the 
parent company, which in turn may lead the multinational to decide to lower employment, wages and 
investment at affiliates in host countries. As explained in the next section, international rent sharing 
within multinational companies may be at the root of this type of vulnerability. Within a multinational 
corporation, firm-specific assets are a joint input, giving economics of scale at the company level 
rather than at the level of the individual plant. Global profits and losses may be shared (with a lag) 
with affiliates and their workers. Due to the trend towards a greater presence of foreign firms, 
domestic wages and employment may thus increasingly reflect international factors in addition to local 




3  INTERNATIONAL RENT SHARING AND THE LABOUR MARKET 
 
This section outlines how international profit sharing within multinational firms may affect domestic 
labour market conditions. Rent sharing is a mechanism through which the increased relevance of FDI 
may contribute to the synchronisation of business cycles among countries. Given the low degree of 
international labour mobility, labour markets are typically thought off as being determined by national 
regulations and governmental policies, negotiations between national employer organisations and 
trade unions and domestic economic conditions and so on. Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996) 
argue that, with increasing globalisation, this closed economy perspective may miss important aspects 
of wage setting. 
 
Multinational companies are by their very nature internationally oriented. As foreign-owned firms’ 
shares in employment and output are substantial in quite a number of countries (Table 1), their 
behaviour may be an important determinant of wage and employment outcomes in host countries. 
Multinational firms have a strong incentive to create an internal market across national borders. They 
may impose company strategies and labour practices on local production units. The option to 
reallocate activities to other countries or to withdraw from markets altogether gives multinational 
firms a strong bargaining position (Edwards, Rees and Coller 1999)  3.  Unlike (direct investment) 
capital, labour throughout the world has been, so far, unable to organise itself across nation-states 
(Letto-Gillies 2000). Edwards, Rees and Coller (1999) examine the consequences of corporate 
restructuring, based on information provided by trade unions in European countries. They find that 
unions are at best involved in negotiating the consequences of mergers and acquisitions, but are rarely 
involved in the initial decision. 
 
Rent sharing 
Within an industry, profits are often shared with local firms and local workers belonging  to that 
particular industry (Christofides and Oswald 1992; Oswald 1996). In the literature, this phenomenon is 
known as economic rent sharing. Figure 2A in Annex II visualizes the main idea of rent sharing that 
apart from local factors, such as the profitability of the individual company, industry-wide profits exert 
a separate, independent influence on wages paid by the firms in the industry. 
 
Within a multinational corporation, firm-specific assets  – such as innovations and knowledge, 
management skills, brands, distribution networks and so on – are a joint input. Typically these firm-
 
3 An interesting example is the Volkswagen agreement in 2001, which led to more flexible work conditions and wage 
moderation. It was quite clear that the management explicitly used the argument that production could be relocated if the 
outcome would not be satisfactory for the management (Andersen 2003).  
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specific assets cannot be split and often requires a large investment in research and development. 
Organising production within a multinational firm protects intangible assets, creating economies of 
scale and scope at the company level rather than the level of the local business unit. Cross-border 
profit (or loss) sharing is the natural consequence of the sharing of firm-specific assets with 
subsidiaries that is essential to a multinational operation. The recent global economic downturn has 
seen quite a few examples of multinational parent losses that had major consequences for wages, 
employment, investment projects and (internal and external) financing at the affiliate level in  host 
countries. However, subsidiaries may also affect parents, as a number of recent accounting scandals 
have shown. Wages and employment at the affiliate level may therefore be determined by local factors 
as well as profitability at the multinational’s top level. Figure 2B in Annex II depicts the practice of 
rent sharing within a multinational firm. 
 
Budd and Slaughter (2000) and Budd, Konings and Slaughter (2002) are the first empirical studies on 
cross-border profit sharing within multinational firms. Budd and Slaughter (2000) analyse 1000 
Canadian labour contracts in manufacturing from 1980 up to 2000. They find support for profit 
sharing across the borders of the US and Canada in both directions: US industry profits have a 
significantly positive effect on wages of US owned affiliates located in Canada, and Canadian industry 
profits affect positively wages of Canadian owned affiliates located in the US. On wages in Canadian 
domestic companies, US industry profits had, however, a negative impact. As high profits in the US 
also point to strength of the American businesses, Canadian domestically owned companies feel 
competitive pressure and respond by restraining wages. Budd, Konings and Slaughter (2002) also find 
micro-evidence of cross-border profit sharing by multinationals within Europe. Their study is based on 
a panel data analysis for almost 900 parent companies concentrated in Western Europe (France, 
Germany, Italy and Belgium) and about 2000 affiliates operating in Europe from 1993 up to 1998. 
With an  elasticity of foreign affiliate wages to parent profits per worker of 0.03, about 20% of 
observed variation in affiliate wages could be explained. 
 
We are not aware of firm-level studies on cross-border profit sharing in terms of employment. 
However, there is ample anecdotal evidence to be found in newspaper reports on employment 
decisions in foreign affiliates that appear to be motivated by the financial needs of the multinational 
parent company rather than by purely local economic conditions. For this reason, we will also 
investigate whether international rent sharing might express itself in a sensitivity of domestic 
employment to profitability conditions abroad.  
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4  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Inspired by the empirical evidence for profit sharing within industries as well as within multinational 
firms, this section investigates whether some sort of profit sharing can be detected at the level of 
national economies. In the spirit of the rent sharing literature, we look whether profits at a higher level 
of aggregation than the unit of observation (country) exert an independent influence on national   real 
wages. In addition, we investigate whether employment is directly affected by this mechanism. Given 
the facilitating role of FDI and multinational firms, our empirical analysis focuses on the six largest 
recipients of direct investment capital: the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, the 
Netherlands and Belgium. Together, they host over 70% of all FDI capital in the OECD area. The 
sample consists of annual observations in the period 1982-2000. 
 
Empirical specification issues 
Our empirical work utilises standard equations for the real wage rate and aggregate employment to 
which we have added a variable that may capture international rent sharing. The standard analytical 
framework underlying the empirical modelling of the labour market assumes that unions and 
employers first bargain about the wage rate and that employers then choose employment. Wages are 
typically explained by domestic factors such as consumer prices, labour productivity and national 
wage pressure variables such as the unemployment rate. Employment mainly depends on the real 
wage rate and the level of output. We estimate the following equations for real wages and aggregate 
employment in the business sector: 
 
012121211 () 3 waplurfpwaplur aaaaldd ---- D=+D-D+--+                           (1) 
 
01232121 () lwyfplywt ggggjff -- D=+D+D+----                                                (2) 
 
w  log of real wage per employee 
apl  log of average productivity of labour 
ur  unemployment rate 
fp  foreign profitability variable 
l  log of employment in business sector 
y  log of production volume of business sector 
t  linear trend 
 
Since the time series involved are non-stationary, eqs. (1) and (2) are of the error correction type, with 
the long-run relationship appearing in the last term. The parameters ? and f  measure the speed of  
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adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium. The expected sign of all slope coefficients is positive. 
Real wages are determined by labour productivity and the bargaining power of labour, which is 
negatively related to the unemployment rate. The employment equation is derived from a CES-
production function, in which employment depends on real wages, output and a (labour saving) 
autonomous rate of technology progress. 
 
To investigate whether the micro-evidence on international rent sharing might have a counterpart at 
the aggregate level, we introduce into the regression equations a variable measuring foreign 
profitability (fp). Conceptually, the variable fp plays the same part as industry-wide profitability in 
studies on rent sharing within industries using firm-level data (Christofides and Oswald 1992). The 
variable fp for country i is calculated as the weighted average of the capital income shares in the 
business sector in the countries of origin of the direct investors in country i 4. The weighting scheme to 
calculate  fp is inspired by the idea that foreign direct investment and multinational firms are the 
channel through which domestic labour markets are affected. The FDI channel may also explain why 
the economic developments in the US are more important for European countries than seems to be 
justified based on international trade patterns alone. For example, for the Netherlands exports to US 
amount to 5% of total exports, whereas over 20% of imported FDI capital originates from the US. 
 
As we focus here on the business-cycle effects of FDI through the cross-border transmission of 
economic shocks, the foreign-profitability measure is added to the dynamic part of the equation only 5. 
Empirical work on rent sharing finds that changes in industry profits take time to pass through to firm-
level wages, with the lag ranging from one to three years (Christofides and Oswald 1992; 
Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey 1996). Based on preliminary experiments, foreign profitability 
enters the wage equations with a two-year lag and the employment equations with a one-year lag. 
Later, we conduct a sensitivity analysis, varying the lag from one to three years. 
 
Throughout the exercise, we use uniform specifications and lag structures across countries, as we are 
primarily interested in the influence of foreign profitability. Furthermore, with an eye on the limited 
number of observations in our sample 1982-2000, we have imposed some cross-country equality 
restrictions on the parameters of conventional determinants. We have freely estimated the coefficients 
of foreign profitability and the speeds of adjustment towards long-run equilibrium, whose t-statistics 
 
4 The weighting scheme aggregates across eight countries of origin, the six countries for which the analysis is done plus Italy 
and Japan. Data on the geographical composition of inward FDI capital are taken from UNCTAD (2002). It would also have 
been interesting to do the analysis with fp defined as the weighted average of profits at the parent company level of all 
foreign-owned firms operating in country i. Unfortunately, such data are unavailable. 
5  This is also consistent with the time series properties of the foreign profitability variable, which is found to be stationary.  
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are equivalent to a co-integration test (Kremers, Ericsson and Dolado 1992). The imposed parameter 
restrictions are easily accepted by the data. The marginal significance level of the Wald test regarding 
the restrictions on the wage equations is 0.79. Its counterpart for the employment equations is 0.85. 
Finally, for b oth labour market variables we jointly estimate the six country equations by the 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method in order to exploit the possibility of 
contemporaneously correlated disturbances across the equations. 
 
Empirical results 
Tables 2 and 3 present our preferred regressions for the real wage rate and employment respectively. 
Turning to the results on the regular determinants first, the estimated coefficients generally have the 
expected sign and are significantly different from zero. This holds for both short-term dynamics and 
long-term equilibrium relations. Gains in labour productivity boost real wages, while run-ups in 
unemployment depress real wages. In the UK and the US, real wages display a much stronger short-
run response to changes in labour productivity than in continental Europe, in particular the small open 
economies Belgium and the Netherlands. In the long run, real wages move almost one-for-one with 
labour productivity in four countries  6. Regarding the sensitivity of wages to unemployment, 
differences between the European countries and the US are limited. German wages are the most 
sensitive to unemployment, in the short run as well as in the long run. In Belgium, wages do not react 
to unemployment in the short run. The error correction coefficient in the real wage equations is 
significant for all countries, indicating co-integration. In three countries, more than half of the 
deviation of actual and long-run equilibrium values is corrected within the space of one year. 
 
The estimates for the employment equations show that in the short run employment reacts much 
stronger to changes in real wages and output in the Anglo-Saxon countries than in continental Europe. 
The estimates for the UK and the US tend to be two to three times larger than their continental 
European counterparts. The high short-run output elasticity of France is the exception on this pattern. 
For Belgium and France, we also find that employment very slowly adjusts to deviations from long-
run equilibrium, although the estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero. In the case of 
France, it takes about four years to cut the initial disequilibrium in half. The corresponding number for 
the fastest adjusting labour market (UK) is less than one year.  Remarkably, Germany has the 
@@@@@   
 
6 The long-run effect of productivity is rather muted in the Netherlands in particular. This might be due to the long-sustained 
policy of wage moderation, which was the result of the 1982 Wassenaar agreement (Den Butter and Mosch 2003).  
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Table 2   Parameter estimates of country wage equations with  fp  lagged  2 years                          1982-2000 
 
Country  a)  Belgium   Netherlands  Germany  France  UK  US 
___________  ___________  ___________  ___________  ___________  ___________  ____________ 
apl D   0.12 
(1.5) 
0.12 









             








( - ) 
-0.007 
( - ) 
-0.007 
( - ) 
             













             












             










( - )    
0.88 
( - )     
             










( - ) 
-0.012 
( - ) 
             
dumGE   b) 
-  -  0.12 
(12.7) 
-  -  - 
 
 
           
2
R   0.38  0.60  0.90  0.61  0.63  0.32 
SE  0.014  0.006  0.012  0.006  0.009  0.012 
LM1         c)  0.66  0.74  0.76  0.11  0.26  0.23 
LM2         c)  0.90  0.05  0.32  0.26  0.19  0.44 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
T-values between brackets 
a)  Wald-test on all combined parameter restrictions:  associated p-value=0.79  
b)  DumGE  is a German re-unification dummy: 0 in the period 1981-1990 and  1 from 1991 onwards       
c)   Associated p-values 
 
same adjustment speed as the US. However, one should keep in mind that, given the shock in wages or 
output, deviations from long-run equilibrium will be much less sizeable to begin with in the US. 
Overall, our findings are consistent with the widely held view that labour markets in continental 
Europe are characterised by poor flexibility compared to the UK and the US. 
 
We next discuss the main results on the influence of foreign profitability on national labour markets 
conditions. For wages, we find a statistically significant effect at the 5% level for Germany, France 
and the UK, while for Belgium there is some tentative supportive evidence for an influence of foreign 
profitability. Regarding employment, we find strong evidence for a role of foreign profitability i n 
Belgium and the Netherlands. Consequently, the US is the only country for which we fail to detect any 
effects of foreign profitability. This may be related to the fact that, due to the large size of the 
American economy compared to the other countries, foreign-owned firms  still account for a relatively   
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Table 3   Parameter estimates of country employment equations with  fp
 lagged 1 year               1982-2000 
 
Country a)  Belgium   Netherlands  Germany  France  UK  US 
___________  ___________  ___________  ___________  ___________  ___________  ___________ 












             












             













             












             
w-1  -0.72 
(9.8) 
-0.72 
( - ) 
-0.72 
( - ) 
-0.72 
( - ) 
-0.72 
( - ) 
-0.72 
( - ) 
             
t  -0.002 
(2.0) 
-0.002 
( - ) 
-0.002 
( - ) 
-0.002 
( - ) 
-0.002 
( - ) 
-0.006 
(6.0) 
             
dumGE   b)  -  -  0.012 
(2.6) 
-  -  - 
             
2












SE  0.003  0.006  0.004  0.008  0.009  0.004 
LM1        c)  0.23  0.25  0.67  0.51  0.10  0.58 
LM2        c)  0.33  0.48  0.13  0.27  0.03  0.71 
 
T-values between brackets. 
a)  Wald-test on combined parameter restrictions:  associated p-value=0.85. 
b)  DumGE is a German re-unification dummy: 0 in the period 1981-1990 and  1 from 1991 onwards.     
c)  Associated p-value. 
 
minor part of US GDP (see Table 1). The phenomenon of international rent sharing may therefore not 
be widespread enough to register at the aggregate level in the US. Table 4 presents the estimated 
coefficients on foreign profitability with the lag varying from one to three years. We focus on the 
difference between the smaller and the larger European countries. Belgium and the Netherlands have 
equal coefficients, and so do France, Germany and the UK 7. The results from this sensitivity analysis 
do not alter our insights fundamentally. Painting with a broad brush, a increase in capital income share 
abroad by one percentage point stimulates employment by around 0.5% after one to two years in  
Belgium and the Netherlands, and raises real wages by around 0.5% after two to three years in the 
 
7 In order to test whether we may speak from a genuine foreign influence, we have also run regressions with domestic 
profitability entering as an additional explanatory variable in the equations. Overall, we find similar results for the impact of 
foreign profitability. In a few cases, the significance of the foreign profitability measure drops substantially, which is an 
indication of multicollineality between foreign and domestic profitability. A table summarizing these results can be found in 
the appendix III.  
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Table 4   Estimates  a3,  3 g  for small vs larger EU-countries with  fp lagged 1, 2 and 3 years  1982-2000   
 
                      Ge= Fr= UK          Be=Nl                            US             
  _____________           _______________          _____________ 
Employment with  fp     
-  lagged 1year  -0.001    (0.9)            0.005     (6.9)           -0.000    (0.5) 
-  lagged 2 years   -0.001    (1.6)            0.004     (4.6)           -0.000    (0.8)  
-  lagged 3 years    0.001    (1.2)            0.002     (2.7)            0.002    (3.2) a)  
 
Wages with  fp 
         
-  lagged 1 year  0.003     (2.0)             0.001     (0.9)           -0.002    (0.6)  
-  lagged 2 years  0.005    (3.9)             0.002     (1.6)            0.002    (0.8)  
-  lagged 3 years  0.005    (5.5)              0.001     (0.9)            0.003    (1.3) 
 
T-values between brackets. 
a)  No longer significant at 95%-level after inclusion of dp US. See also Annex III, Table 3A. 
 
larger European countries. In all countries, total compensation is temporarily 0.5 percentage points 
higher, providing a spending impulse to the domestic economy.  Between 1997 and 2000 foreign 
profitability declined by about 1.5 percentage points for all six countries. The unusually synchronised 
nature of the downturn in 2001 may be partly due to the rent-sharing phenomenon. Of course, these 
numbers are partial, first-order effects. For example, the rise in real wages will  also  affect 
employment, competitiveness and so on. T herefore,  the overall implications of international rent 
sharing need to be i nvestigated further in the context of a macroeconomic multi-country model (see 
Conclusions).    
 
Regarding the timing of the impact of foreign profitability, Table 4 suggests that wages display a more 
delayed response than employment. This can be explained by the way contractual wages are set. As 
wage agreements between firms and trade unions often fix pay for the next one to three years, 
contractual wages tend to react to changes in determinants with a substantial lag. By contrast, firms 
enjoy more flexibility to alter capital spending plans or to expand or contract their labour force as a 
consequence of higher profits abroad. 
 
Finally, Tables 2–4 suggest that in small countries (Belgium and the Netherlands) it is employment 
that benefits from an improvement in profitability abroad, while in large countries (France, Germany 
and the UK) it is wages. One could say that the ‘foreign dividend’ is mostly paid out in the form of 
more jobs in Belgium and the Netherlands and in the form of higher wages in France, Germany and 
the UK. This might reflect differences in preferences of trade unions with respect to the trade-off 
between wages and employment. Trade unions in small open economies might be more aware of the 
negative effects of high wages on competitiveness of domestic firms in home and foreign markets. 
They may therefore be more avid to protect jobs or expanding employment than to extract high wages 
from firms. By contrast, unions in large countries may feel less constrained by such considerations and 
focus more on securing high wages.  
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5   CONCLUSIONS 
 
Foreign affiliates account for a significant part of output in many industrialised countries. However, 
compared to international trade, relatively little is known about the role of FDI and multinational firm 
behaviour in the transmission of disturbances from one country to the next at the aggregate level. In 
related research, we found that countries that maintain comparatively intense FDI relations also have 
business cycles that are more correlated, even when foreign trade relations were taken into account. In 
this paper, we therefore attempt to shed some light on the underlying mechanisms at work in the FDI 
transmission channel. Inspired by the micro-evidence on  profit sharing within multinational 
corporations and within industries, we investigate whether a cross-border rent-sharing phenomenon 
can be identified at the aggregate level. More specifically, we examine for Belgium, France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, the UK and the US whether domestic labour market conditions (wages and 
employment) are partly determined by profitability conditions abroad. The rent-sharing hypothesis 
implies that an increase in foreign profitability should boost wages and/or employment in the domestic 
economy. 
 
We find that employment in B elgium and the Netherlands positively responds to improvements 
foreign profitability with a lag of one year, but that wages do not react. We obtain the reverse pattern 
for France, Germany and the UK. In these countries, wages are affected by foreign profitability with a 
lag of two years, but employment is not. Our findings point to the existence of a form of international 
rent sharing at the aggregate level. Union preferences may determine whether the rent sharing involves 
wages or employment. US labour market conditions do not appear to be sensitive to changes in 
profitability in other countries, which could be explained by the still relatively modest role of foreign-
owned investment capital in the American economy. 
 
Up until now, international trade and financial asset prices serve as the main linkages among 
individual economies in the econometric models that are employed by national policy makers and 
international organisations, such as the IMF and the OECD. The absence of FDI as a transmission 
channel may lead policy makers to underestimate the degree of interdependence in the world 
economy. Our results suggest that adding a variable measuring foreign profitability to the specification 
of wage or employment equations could be a useful first step towards the incorporation of the FDI 
transmission channel into (large-scale) econometric models. In a future research project, we plan to 
examine the relative importance of this particular channel of transmission in a multi-country model. 
Another topic on our research agenda is possible spillovers on investment behaviour. Finally, it would 
be interesting to repeat the empirical analysis for data on the industry level, as the degree of 
international rent sharing may considerably differ across industries. 
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ANNEX  I              








Figure 1A  FDI-position for selected countries
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Figure 1B  Foreign trade selected economies
% GDP
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ANNEX  II  
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+ Firm 2 Firm 1
1212 /n()/(nn) ppp =++
1 w





+ Firm 2 Firm 1
1212 /n()/(nn) ppp =++
1 w






Country A Country B
Affiliate 2 Affiliate1
1212 /n()/(nn) ppp =++
1 w






Country A Country B
Affiliate 2 Affiliate1
1212 /n()/(nn) ppp =++
1 w





- 19 - 
 
ANNEX III     
 
 
Table 3A   Parameter estimates for fpwith and without domestic profitability dp in Eq 1 and 2 
 
               Country 
Parameter 
Belgium   Netherlands  Germany  France  UK      US 
______________  _________  __________  _________  ________  _________  _________ 
             
                                                                         Wages   
              


























             


























             


























             
Employment 
 


























             


























             



























Shaded areas (dark+light): Cases for which we have found significant international rent sharing effects 
Light shaded areas:  Cases of international rent sharing that are no longer significant after inclusion of  
domestic profitability (95%-confidence level)    
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